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 Abstract 
 
The author outlines the technological frames strand of social shaping of 
technology theory and posits that the dimensions used by the major 
proponents of the theory to not necessarily apply to all situations. The 
proposal is to use an analogy of a technological bubble rather than a frame 
to describe in particular the interaction of emergency services personnel in 
emergency situations. The qualities of the bubble as soft-edged, three 
dimensional and ephemeral lends well to the correlation between the tasks 
beliefs and attitudes of emergency workers and their relationships with 
technological artefacts. 
Keywords:- Emergency work, technological frames, social 
shaping, technological bubbles
Introduction 
The work of emergency services and similar tasks in emergency medical 
situations seems to pose several issues with regard to supporting 
information systems. This chapter applies the theory of technological 
frames from the social shaping of technology theory, to the very particular 
work of the emergency services and those employed in allied types of 
work.  Studies from across the spectrum of those involved in emergency 
work are consolidated and synergised and common themes are recognized. 
The particular elements of information systems that apply to this type of 
work are identified and technological frames theory is then used to explain 
the views of emergency work professionals towards different types of 
information systems. The author suggests that Technological Frames are 
inappropriate to describe emergency situations and proposes a new 
analogy of the ‘technological bubble’ which corresponds more closely 
with those factors particular to emergency services.  
Social Shaping of Technology Theoretical Background 
Social shaping theorists (Mackenzie and Wajcman 1985; Edge 1988) argue 
that technologies are socially shaped in that their resulting material form 
reflects the political, economic and social circumstances of their 
development. They posit that the practices, assumptions, beliefs and 
language involved in design and manufacture are built into the technology 
and have consequences for deployment and implementation.  
Relevant Social Groups 
The theory of technological frames (Bijker 1993; Orlikowski and Gash 
1994) furthers this explanation and brings in the notion of shared 
technological frames of reference, where members of relevant social 
groups  (Pinch and Bijker 1984) share perceptions, attitudes and 
approaches to technological artefacts and their usage, and are said to share 
technological frames of reference.  In and across organisations, many such 
groups are likely to emerge and some individuals may be members of 
several groups in that for example, they may be both a manager and a user. 
Group members may be technical specialists, suppliers, consultants, 
policymakers, existing users with knowledge of preceding systems, new 
users with no experience, users with experience of alternative or 
competing systems, managers, supervisors and other consumers of 
resultant data, both internal and external to the organisation.  Significantly 
group members may also include those who do not interact directly with 
the technology, known as secondary users (Ferneley and Light 2006).  
It is clear from the diversity of identified relevant social groups across a 
variety of studies (Iivari and Abrahamsson 2002; McGovern and Hicks 
2004) that these groups will have differing understandings of the purpose 
and utility of the technology; differing views of the usefulness and 
accuracy of the data produced; and differing views of data ownership
1 
and 
resultant implications.  
Review of technological frames theory 
The notion of technological frames states that relevant social groups share 
assumptions, knowledge and expectations expressed through language, 
visual images, metaphors and stories (Orlikowski & Gash 1994).  
Frames are constructed as an interaction around an artefact or process, and 
comprise shared elements such as tacit knowledge, objectives, 
organisational constraints, shared methods, and procedures and problems.   
In this way the relationships between relevant social group members are 
captured but made fluid and open to change where the elements change. 
Frames are flexible in structure and content and have variable dimensions 
that shift in relevance and content over time and according to changing 
context. According to Orlikowski and Gash (1994), frames typically 
operate in the background and can be helpful in that they reduce 
uncertainty of conditions, structure organisational experience and allow 
common interpretations of ambiguity. They can also have constraining 
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effects in that they reinforce established and possibly negative assumptions 
and knowledge, inhibit creative problem solving and distort information to 
fit existing cognitive structures (Orlikowski and Gash 1994). Orlikowski 
and Gash use framework dimensions that are common to most 
organisations and use three main domains to contrast their case study 
frames. These are: nature of technology, technology strategy (including 
motivation and criteria of success); and technology in use (including 
priorities and resources, training, ease-of use, and security and quality 
policies).   
Another issue regarding technological frames is the concept of congruence 
and incongruence (Orlikowski and Gash 1994). Congruence of 
technological frames implies similar expectations around the role of 
technology in business processes and incongruence implies important 
differences in expectations or assumptions around key technological 
aspects.  Sobreperez (2008) suggests further preconditions for frame 
incongruence such as enforced proceduralisation, and cultural issues. A 
more recent study (Prell 2009) develops a useful alternative method for 
analyzing technological frames by identifying congruent or differing goals, 
problems and strategies as well as tacit knowledge and key material 
resources, reverting back to the original frame dimensions as outlined by 
Bijker (1993) .   
Davidson’s (2002) review of technological frames theory suggests that 
most applications of theory fail to investigate; the process of ‘framing’; the 
cultural and institutional foundations of frames; and the characteristics and 
consequences of frame structure. She points out that the majority of studies 
are by their very nature contextually bound as case study scenarios and fail 
to further the theory, simply recognising their existence in a particular case 
study setting.   
One implication of social shaping of technology theory is that the specific 
usage of systems in all workplace situations is often not known at the time 
of design and implementation. This is particularly true in emerging 
technologies where potential uses and usefulness are often not well 
understood by suppliers, users, developers or managers (Gasser 1986).  To 
include and consider these users, both final and intermediate, draws 
attention to the full range of groups of people included in systems 
development, implementation and deployment.   
Differing attitudes to Data Collection and Usage  
Differing attitudes to data collection and usage are often the result of 
incongruence in technological frames of reference. Often, and across 
several studies, (Lankshear and Mason 2001; Ferneley and Sobreperez 
2006; Sobreperez 2008) there is little understanding at operator level of the 
usage of information. Operators view this with some acrimony as 
surveillance leading to personal performance monitoring. The data is often 
used to calculate bonuses and feeds forward into informal verbal reward 
and admonishment situations and into formal annual appraisals. However, 
it is also used by managers to review and plan workflow, site new 
equipment, and forecast expansion potential. The very hierarchical and 
adversarial nature of the organisational culture may lead to an ethos of 
mistrust and misunderstanding, so that each faction or group not only do 
not understand but do not want to understand the requirements of the 
others. 
This perspective is highlighted by Howcroft and Wilson (2000) who 
discuss the politics of IS evaluation concluding that the issues, factors, 
measurements, and  benchmarks attended to and studied in evaluations are 
determined by those with a particular political agenda.   They are likely to 
justify decisions and investments already made, likely to be heavily 
influenced by those who selected and ordered systems, may be from the 
same department or may even be the same individuals.   They are also 
unlikely to measure such soft factors as usability, user satisfaction or ease 
of use.  Howcroft and Wilson (2000) argue that despite protestations of 
objectivity and independence, there are often factors involved in IS 
evaluation which would be viewed differently by different relevant social 
groups, and that the evaluation process is distorted by those with the power 
to legitimize views of systems.  
This position is also evident in a Fire Service study (Sobreperez & 
Ferneley 2006) where visits to the local statistics office of the County 
force and to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister revealed quite 
different attitudes to the information systems including those of 
acceptance, approval confidence and trust. The very idea of 
communicating and cooperating with users undermines the status, power 
and privilege of managers, developers and those that ‘know best’ how to 
organise work activity (Markus 1983). The groups involved in the 
development and usages of information systems often have different 
priorities and goals and this creates the potential for conflict and 
controversy.  
Although this may be true in a standard organisational setting, the very 
opposite is true in the emergency situation. The technology is not shared, 
but the problems priorities and goals are shared and in this way a 
technological frame’s dimensions are better described using these 
concepts.  This position is more in line with the original frame dimensions 
identified by Bijker(1993) than with those identified by Orlikowski and 
Gash(1994).  
Emergency Services 
The complexity of interactions between groups has been highlighted 
(Fincham, Fleck et al. 1995) as a probable cause of even further problems 
where complex human action, not necessarily understood in depth by 
developers and technical specialists, is intended to be supported using 
information systems.   This is particularly true where each incident is 
different and stakeholders, both individually and as a group, bring a large 
amount of tacit experience and knowledge to a situation. In emergency 
services, each incident is extremely idiosyncratic and must be dealt with so 
dynamically that there can be no ‘right answer’ to the way it is handled. 
Although organisations such as police or fire authorities and individual 
hospital and ambulance services issue risk management policies in an 
attempt to improve practice and minimise risk, the particular 
circumstances of each incident render these into guidelines at best. 
Approaches are and must be contingent on the location and severity of the 
incident; the speed of occurrences, events and responses; the skills and 
expertise of those present; and the response of the control centre and senior 
employees present or not present. As each incident is unique it becomes 
difficult to draw up and apply rules and guidelines and it may be that what 
superficially appear to be similar incidents are dealt with entirely 
differently in response to a variety of factors which will be complex and 
problematic to identify. In view of this it becomes increasingly challenging 
to create information systems to match and support workforce action or to 
manage knowledge across an organisation involved in highly complex 
individualistic, distinctive incidents which need to be grouped and 
consolidated in a variety of ways to be presented to policy makers and 
managers. 
Emergency situations 
Recent studies which involve workplaces associated with the public sector 
and in particular health services, emergency services and social work 
highlight situations which seem unique to emergency situations.   These 
include papers covering issues of acceptance and resistance  in the fire 
service (Xiaodong, Chen et al. 2004; Ferneley, Sobreperez et al. 2005; 
Ferneley and Sobreperez 2006); papers covering workarounds and success 
or failure perceptions in the UK NHS including surgeons, nurses and 
midwives (Lankshear and Mason 2001; Timmons 2003; Kobayashi, 
Fussell et al. 2005; Lankshear, Ettorre et al. 2005; Blegind Jensen and 
Aanestad 2007), in the ambulance service (Beynon-Davies 1999) and in 
social work, (Broadhurst, Wastell et al. 2010).  This chapter is not 
confined to the recognised ‘classic’ emergency services of police, fire, and 
ambulance, but also extends to include emergency situations in social work 
and in hospital wards. In this case then emergency then can be defined as 
situations where there is immediate threat to life, health, property or the 
environment. 
Analysis of emergency situations covering literally life and death 
situations reveals that the work is highly complex and involves judgement 
and decision making and continuous dynamic risk assessment. In 
emergency decision making, there is often incomplete information and 
uncertainty; there may be a variety of ‘expert views’ on the assumptions 
that can possibly be made and the most appropriate way forward in the 
light of incomplete and constantly changing information.    
An emergency incident or medical situation is likely to include many 
professionals and specialists with in depth knowledge and expertise of a 
single aspect of the emergency situation. For example a road traffic 
accident may include police, fire and ambulance workers, and within these 
specialists in traffic management, chemical and fuel spillage, particular 
types of injuries, paramedics, trauma specialists,  helicopter pilots, 
extrication specialists and a myriad of other skills and professions. An 
emergency in a hospital will include doctors, nurses of various levels, and 
again specialists such as midwives, anaesthetists, and various technicians.  
Several have criticised technological frame theory for ignoring workplace 
hierarchies and assuming equality across groups (Russell 1986; Winner 
1993), whereas in reality the hierarchy changes according to the unfolding 
subcomponents of the event. The traditional hierarchy is often not 
available and contingent decisions must be made.   
Emergency Decision making 
Decision making in emergency circumstances is not an individual issue 
based on expertise and judgement, instead decisions are made in 
interactions among various members and categories of staff in relation to 
various risks. Individual decisions are often open to dispute, negotiation 
and occasionally the pulling of rank. This leads to difficulty in determining 
responsibility for and attribution of decision making. Often decisions 
emerge from a range of informal and tacit invisible consultations and 
conversations (Lankshear, Ettorre et al. 2005).  
A study of birth delivery suites (Cioffi 2000) highlights the hierarchies 
involved in emergency decision making.  When birthing situations hit 
complications, midwives, although they know well what should be done, 
and often have many more years experience than an individual doctor, 
often bring in doctors for ‘formal’ decision-making.  Despite this, 
midwives are involved in continuous informal decision- making activities 
through constant monitoring and often pool this information leading to a 
‘joint competence’ (Hn Tjore 2000) by calling on the experience of a 
variety of colleagues and thus providing reassurance by legitimising 
decisions. Clearly the decision to involve a doctor as a formal decision 
maker is one of the most important decisions. The minimising of risk in 
delivery suites occurred in this study when decisions regarding particular 
at risk patients were collective. In this way then, it seems clear that, in 
practice, decision-making in emergency situations is a socially negotiated 
activity (Horlick-Jones et al 2001).   
Formal methods of record keeping present decision-making as individual, 
in that only an individual can log into information system under their 
personally allocated user name and password and thus the recording of a 
decision becomes attributable to them. Recognition that there may be a 
variety of expert opinions and views has led NHS administrators in an 
attempt to regulate decision-making, to minimise risk and improve practice 
through policy.  This has led to regular clinical audit and increased support 
for technological interventions, and most importantly the issue of 
accountability. Typically public information systems serve multiple users 
and users crossing political jurisdictions (Newcomer and Caudle 1991). 
This includes policy and practice on primary purpose of the data, freedom 
of information requirements, privacy and confidentiality safeguards, data 
sharing, and attribution of data entry. 
Accountability and information recording  
The increasingly litigious and ‘heads will roll’ accountability of the public 
sector in the light of errors, omissions and oversights makes the fear of 
litigation paramount in the minds of professionals in emergency situations. 
Several authors (Symonds 1987; Clements 1991; Symonds 1993; Symon 
1998) have concluded that risks are avoided in order to prevent litigation 
(James 1993).  In the NHS, within this risk avoidance culture, strategies 
are developed to ensure any patient’s accusation that the provision of care 
was less than satisfactory cannot be ‘blamed’ on individuals or teams and 
this has been entitled ‘defensive medicine’ (Kessler and McClellan 1996). 
These two issues; fear of litigation and enforced individual data entry, can 
lead to distrust of and resistance to information systems in emergency 
settings. For example consider Lankshear and Mason’s (2001) study of 
situations in a maternity ward where midwifes and practitioner users did 
not appreciate the ramifications to the dataset of circumventing various 
data capture processes. So, whilst from the user’s perspective the system 
hindered their working practices, from a management perspective the 
workarounds had negative ramifications as they destroyed the information 
system’s data integrity.   This ties in with the concept of technological 
frames from the Social Shaping of Technology theoretical framework 
(Orlikowski and Gash 1994) in that the differing ‘relevant social groups’ 
have differing technological frames for perceiving, understanding and 
accepting the information systems within their organisations. 
Technological frames theory suggests that a process of action and 
interaction involving communication and collaboration between relevant 
social groups form and shape the technology (Van Maanen and Schein 
1979; Porac, Thomas et al. 1989).  The different levels and areas of 
expertise in many overlapping fields, and the different objectives, priorities 
and concerns of these groups suggests that there is considerable potential 
for poor communication, discord and conflict.  This is particularly true of 
professionals working in the emergency services.  
Emergency workers 
It seems clear that the public sector is different from the private sector in 
that many public sector workers recognise a vocational element to their 
work, and to their identity.  This may be particularly true in the case of 
education, health and social care, and in emergency services in that these 
occupations are intrinsically different from the clerical, administrative and 
managerial public sector occupations that support rather than deliver the 
primary function. Many public sector organisations have a largely 
administrative function, such as local councils, government departments 
and their local and regional functions, but a large number also include this 
vocational element which might be characterised by a desire to support and 
assist those who are in need, either temporarily or permanently, of 
assistance and help. This is a very loose definition and can be traced to the 
work of Blum (1993) who describes a personal identification and personal 
engagement with values and ideals which engender a moral pull. 
Vocational professions are motivated by care and the specific needs of 
specific patients/pupils/people in danger in specific situations  and 
employees respond to values external to themselves and appropriate to the 
occupation (White 2002). Blum identifies a transcendence of the personal 
in the name of the vocation.  
Emergency services workers then are likely to have these vocational 
attitudes to their profession, but in addition they must have the personal 
resources to deal with dangerous and perilous situations often involving 
death and serious injury and the highly distressed individuals associated 
with such encounters. There has been some inconclusive work on the 
notion of the ‘rescue personality’ where Mitchell and Bray (1990) suggest 
that in order to effectively implement information systems, professionals 
must have knowledge of the unique personalities of emergency personnel 
and the specialized jobs they perform in extreme environments. 
Could it be then that there are issues particular to these emergency 
professions that do not apply for example to production or banking 
scenarios?  This is not to say that resistance is more usual, common or 
typical in these types of case study, but it may be useful to identity the 
particular factors present in these types of situations which make it 
difficult for information systems to be supportive and useful. 
The suggestion of the author is that the view of identifying relevant social 
groups by their job title oversimplifies the idea of technological frames in 
two ways. Firstly there is the assumption that people fall into groups and 
that each group has a particular unchanging view or frame of reference 
when considering technology. Secondly there is an underlying assumption 
that group members already in a group identified socially, or in a work 
context, will share technological frames. For example, Ferneley and 
Sobreperez (2006) identify managers, firefighters and statisticians, 
Lankshear, Ettorre and Mason (2005) identify nurses and doctors and Prell 
(2009) identifies academics and professors, youth service workers, and 
students. 
This assumption is over simplistic, there may be many senior managers in 
any organisation who feel that systems are imposed from above, that they 
have no ownership of the data, and that there are significant differences 
between what actually happened and the recorded version. In this way 
then, members of a particular relevant social group, who share attitudes, 
opinions and points of view over their interaction with technologies, may 
cut across management hierarchies, job titles and salary scales. It may also 
be pointed out that management takes many forms from supervisor to 
managing director and that rather than viewing a polarity between 
managers and workforces, there is a continuum which includes many 
different levels of management, with all but the top level subordinate and 
answerable to the level above.  
Emergency workers and technological frames 
In addition, members of relevant social groups may have different attitudes 
to different types of technologies. An example is that in the fire service a 
working class, masculine culture prevails. Firefighters see themselves as 
brave men and heroes, unconcerned with the ‘paperwork’ of recording 
systems and emphasize their ‘proper’ work is facing danger to save lives 
and property. In the UK they are strongly unionised, protective of their 
masculine role as ‘breadwinner’ and resistant to the introduction of female 
firefighters(Sobreperez 2008).   Firefighters hold differing attitudes to 
different categories of technology, as did nurses and medical staff in the 
Lankshear (2005)  study. The workforce seems to separate technologies 
into those which support their primary role, i.e nursing or firefighting, and 
those which are seen as bureaucratic. A study of surgeons acceptance of 
EPR systems (Blegind Jensen and Aanestad 2007) found that surgeons 
were happy to use patient health monitoring technology to check vital 
signs during surgery and to facilitate the surgery, such as imaging, X rays, 
and scanning. However resistance was met when surgeons were required 
to undertake tasks previously done by others such as creating prescriptions, 
rather than leaving this to an administrator, and resistance to the keyboard 
and screen in the operating theatre was vocal, where such artefacts are seen 
to belong to other groups of workers, variously described as secretaries or 
administrators. The introduction of performance management techniques 
in the UK public sector in the 1980’s has become entrenched and the 
associated determination of performance targets and the link to resource 
allocation is now widespread. This has been termed New Public 
management (NPM) and includes financial monitoring and accountability, 
the establishment of ‘internal markets’ between service providers and 
within organisations, and the development of a range of performance 
measures and benchmarking techniques by which individuals, units, 
departments, sections, divisions and entire organisations are compared and 
judged by their managers, by service receivers and by the taxpayer and 
politicians through the media (Hood 1991; Osbourne and Gaebler 1992; 
Hoggett 1996; Pollitt 1997; Hood, James et al. 1999; Thomas and Davies 
2005).  It is the information overhead imposed by this development that 
ensure professionals at all levels must micro-record much of their activity 
and compare it to national and local benchmarks, league tables, and 
performance monitoring systems.   Often emergency professionals must 
undertake this, as the only personnel ‘in situ’ at an emergency, and this 
often causes resentment due to incongruent technological frames between 
administrators and emergency workers. 
Information users in emergency healthcare or blue-light emergency 
services are often highly trained professionals in firefighting, healthcare or 
social work and crucially do not see record keeping as part of their job. 
They are frustrated and annoyed at having to keep records which may be 
seen to undermine their professional autonomy. They see computer use 
and record keeping as someone else’s job; they often do not have 
ownership of information and consider it ‘nothing to do with me’. Their 
‘real’ job is nursing, putting out fires, or assisting vulnerable children or 
adults from dysfunctional families which may include emergency crises 
arising from mental health and drug abuse issues (Lankshear, Ettorre et al. 
2005; Sobreperez 2008; Broadhurst, Wastell et al. 2010).  
Relevant Social Groups and Frame Dimensions 
With reference to information technology in organisations, there are 
generally a number of social groups critical to the development of 
technological change (Kling and Gerson 1978).   These include at least 
managers, systems developers and users, and of course several categories 
of each may share or overlap frames.  The different groups of users then, 
are open to amendment and an individual may belong to several groups at 
anyone time. This implies that technological frames are fluid and 
individual and may appear to negate and subvert the idea of shared 
technological frames.  However if we use the goals, problems and 
strategies structure identified by Prell (2009) and taken from Bijker (1993), 
we can see that the notion of congruence can be underpinned by the notion 
that where these three structural items are shared, the technological frame 
can be shared, across professions, agencies, and specialisms. During the 
ephemeral time period of the emergency incident, sharing of frames is 
given great relevance, however once the danger is past, those who need to 
use technology to make records, or to monitor stability, will be left to their 
own particular specialisms.  
Emergency Incidents and Technology 
In an emergency situation the problems might be exemplified as 
extricating trapped people, managing traffic flow around the incident, 
putting out fire or managing individual injuries. The goals might be to 
solve these issues while at the same time preserving life and property, 
reducing damage to people and property, minimising disruption to traffic 
flow etc.  The strategies will include the assessment and prioritisation of 
necessary action and communication with additional support systems such 
as air ambulance or additional specialist equipment. This brief outline 
gives very general scenarios where problems, goals and strategies are 
shared which is important for the next stage of the analysis. 
Firefighters are willing to use sensors to check toxicity, temperatures and 
location, and medical staff are happy and willing to use all kinds of 
technologies to monitor and check patient progress. However when it 
comes to the record-keeping and the compilation of statistics for 
benchmarking, performance monitoring or comparison, a marked lack of 
compliance is evident. Thus actors are members of several differing 
technological frames, which may conflict or overlap. It seems clear that 
resistance displayed is not resistance to the technology, but to the task. 
Many emergency workers are very well aware of and protective of their 
professional discretion and thoroughly reject managerial standardisation, 
regulation, bureaucratisation and monitoring of their role.    
The cultural and institutional foundations of differing frames (Davidson 
2006) can be distinguished by the differing educational backgrounds, 
career paths, workplace and data usage of the relevant social groups which 
may account for incompatible attitudes to data collection and utilisation. 
Understandings, interpretations and expectations of information systems 
are framed and reframed through the exercise of power (Lin and Silva 
2005) thus in the context of data collection and usage, emergency workers 
are in the least powerful position. In the exercise of their skill in 
emergency situations however, they are in the most powerful position, 
through the tacit knowledge and skills they have and through the 
professional autonomy they hold.  
Technological frame theory suggests a fixed view by individuals who 
work as a group. These groups are identified as such in that they share 
elements of knowledge, agree over meanings, have a set of beliefs in 
common, and share assumptions and expectations. They are referred to, 
and in many ways behave in some situations, as a unit. The emergency 
situation though, includes the following  
 
 Life and death situations 
 Dynamic fast changing situations  
 The need for immediate and robust decision making 
 
Technological bubbles 
The author presents an alternative notion; that of the technological bubble 
– an attitude to technology shared by groups of individuals who only 
temporarily share the beliefs, requirements, trust and knowledge of a 
certain technology. Once the moment has passed, the shared belief is no 
longer required and the bubble is burst. Rather than viewing attitudes and 
approaches to technology as framebound, it may be more appropriate to 
look at a less rigid model.  The notion of the technological bubble arises as 
an analogy which may be more appropriate. Particularly in circumstances 
which involve factors such as dynamic decision making, fast changing 
situations with far-reaching consequences, and a mixture of professionals 
and specialists with individual technological knowledge and skills. The 
work of emergency services is an extreme example of this type of 
situation.  
Bubbles are soft edged, they sometimes arise in numbers and sometimes 
the edges between them blend so that two or more bubbles become one.  In 
an emergency situation then technological bubbles arise around a 
particular event or component of the situation, e.g. freeing someone 
trapped, or dealing with chemical spillage. Those working on that 
component of the situation will share the technical bubble, such as sensors, 
monitors or cutting equipment, and although they do not all deal with the 
technology, they share an attitude to it, in that they give it priority, as a 
strategy to solve the shared problem and reach the shared goal.  
Bubbles are ephemeral, they last only as long as the surface tension is 
sufficient to hold them in place. This matches the emergency service 
technological bubble as the goals and priorities will merge and shift as 
different components of the incident take priority but the bubble will be 
over when the goal is reached.   Technological bubbles then will also 
blend, merge and burst as different technologies are used an supported by 
sets and subsets of people involved in the incident. In some emergency 
situations people come together from different agencies and from across 
regions, they may be complete strangers and never meet again, however 
for a brief time period, they share a technological bubble. There will often 
be multiple bubbles, indeed a foam of bubbles, present at the same incident 
and in a constant state of emerging, merging, dividing and bursting. 
Technological bubbles are three dimensional and can include many 
factors,  underlying dynamics and structures such as targets and 
benchmarks, and the complex relationships between differing professions, 
specialists and agencies present at an emergency incident.  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, technological frames theory is a well used model which may 
be entirely appropriate for many standard organisational situations. 
However there are many situations for which it is not a suitable and 
appropriate tool. The work of emergency services is an extreme example 
of the type of work that does not lend itself to the notion of technological 
frames and the author suggests that the notion of the technological bubble 
is a more appropriate analogy due to the properties of dimension, 
transience and shape changing.  
It seems then that where technology is seen to support the primary function 
of the emergency worker in an emergency situation, it will be seen with 
one lens and will fall into a technological frame which views this as 
acceptable and adoptable. Where the technology is perceived to support an 
organisational function not accepted as part of the emergency workers 
tasks, i.e. when the bubble bursts and routine bureaucratic tasks retake 
priority, it will fall into a different technological frame and will be resisted 
or rejected. 
Several previous studies involving emergency situations have been 
referred to in this analysis, but currently the notion of technological 
bubbles is not supported by empirical primary data collection. An 
empirical study is necessary to observe and substantiate the notion and 
amend or adapt the suggested bubble representation.  
Although the emergency services are used here this may be a useful model 
for examining other ephemeral situations such as sports events, theatrical 
and arts based events, conferences and sales fairs and other similar 
situations. 
Acronyms  
 
NHS – National Health Service 
EPR – Enterprise Resource Planning 
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